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Abstract
The use of laboratory experimental methods in economics has been growing rapidly. 
With each application, new insights are gained about how the methodology can be used to 
supplement the more traditional forms of research. Such was the case with the 
development of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policy for the auction 
of licenses for Personal Communication Systems (PCS). At several different stages the 
laboratory experimental methods of economics were used. The application differed at 
each of these stages, representing the different types of relationships that can exist among 
theory, observation, and policy. This paper is a brief account of the applications. 
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1. LABORATORY METHODS
Perhaps, before discussing the FCC auctions, it would be instructive to provide a word or 
two on the nature of experimental economics. The basic idea is to use substantial 
financial incentives to create auction processes. The people engaging in the auctions 
make money that is theirs to keep. The characteristics of the people, the nature of the 
incentives, the rules of the auctions, what people are told, etc., are all carefully considered 
and may differ among experiments depending upon the purpose and what one wants to 
know. The experimental procedures, like the ones employed in the experiments reported 
here, are exactly the same as ones that have been subjected to thousands of studies. The 
results of the experiments are compared internally against theory and other types of 
experiments, so confidence is built that the results are not due to some sort of special or 
isolated feature. 
The general idea of a laboratory experiment is to study· the operation of rules, such 
as auction rules, in very simple cases. The simplicity assures that the nature of any 
problems detected can be identified and studied. The variables studied reflect human 
behavior in the use of the rules, the relationship of behavior to the technology used to 
implement the rules of the auction, and the reliability of the technology itself. An 
experimental "testbed" is a simple working prototype of a process that is going to be 
employed in a complex environment. The creation of the prototype and the study of its 
operation provides a joining of theory, observation, and the practical aspects of 
implementation, in order to create something that works. 
2. AN OVERVIEW AND THE CONTEXT OF APPLICATIONS
The most intense use of experimental methods in the FCC applications occurred at three 
different stages of the policy making process. At each of these· stages natural research 
partnerships could be identified. Initially, the experimental research was focused on 
broad aspects of the rules that might be put in place. This was the first stage of 
"testbedding," as the properties of substantially different types of rules were examined. 
The second stage of testbedding evolved as the rules began to take a more definite form. 
The study shifted to detailed features of particular rules and was then expanded to include 
assessments of the operational form of specific rules as they were implemented in the 
software. Rules, stated as policy, can be very different when they are put in operational 
form as procedures and software. Simple laboratory environments provide an 
inexpensive method of discovering practical problems with the rules, as they are found in 
the real software setting, that could prove to be very expensive if surfacing during the 
operation of a multiple billion dollar auction. Thus, at this stage, the experimental 
methods were, in a sense, part of "debugging" research. The final stage of application 
occurred during the actual operation of the auction. The observations from experiments 
were used as a source of judgment about events that were taking place during the 
auctions. The paper addresses what was done and what was learned from these different 
applications. 
3. RESEARCH ON RULES: THE FIRST STAGE
The first stage focused on the rules of the auction and the consequent behavior that might 
be expected under various conditions. Different rules can induce different patterns of 
outcomes in terms of efficiency and distribution, depending upon the underlying 
economic conditions. Much of the theory that existed at the time of the design of the 
auction was incomplete and untested. No single theory existed about which there was a 
consensus. The first stage of experimental work was, thus, closely connected to the 
development of theory and a sensitivity to the differences of opinions that existed among 
theorists. 
Research during this first stage was difficult. The rules were not determined. Up 
to, and even during the actual auction, the rules were constantly and rapidly evolving. By 
practical necessity, and the need for information, the experiments typically addressed a 
feature of the rules, or features of classes of rules, as opposed to fully testing some well 
defined set of rules and procedures. The environment in which the actual auctions would 
take place was similarly uncertain. It was assumed that the items auctioned involved 
complementarities, and that a large number of participants would be bidding. But, the 
full implications of these assumptions were never fully explored. Similarly, many 
relevant environments were not studied at all .  For example, while it is well established 
experimentally that uncertain common values of the items auctioned can result in a 
winner's curse, the special problems that might surface for FCC rules in common value 
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types of environments, were not pursued. Time and resources prevented the study of 
many interesting and important problems. 
Testimony during the FCC decision making process provided a focus for early 
experiments. Three major issues that surfaced in the testimony were chosen for 
experimental examination. The first issue was whether the auction would be one of the 
forms commonly found implemented by professional auction houses, such as oral 
auctions, or would be something completely new. In part, this first issue seemed to turn 
on whether it was technologically feasible to do something new and completely different 
from the time tested methods of auctioning things. The second issue was focused more 
narrowly on the definitions and characteristics of particular classes of rules, whether the 
licenses should be sold sequentially or simultaneously. The third issue was similarly 
focused on the details of the rules, and the type of behavior that might be observed under 
different rules. As will be discussed, this third issue was closely associated with the 
economic environments that might exist for the FCC auctions. The expected behavior 
can differ dramatically depending upon the environmental features present. The research 
focused on rules that might be able to operate in troublesome environments. 
A. Something Old or Something New 
The most commonly used auction rules, as implemented by professional auction houses, 
are sealed bids and oral, ascending bid auctions in which items are sold sequentially. 
Experimental research suggested that sealed bid auctions would not function as desired. 
Almost all experimental work suggests that some sort of iteration is necessary for 
processes to have the efficiency and price discovery properties suggested by pure theory. 
Equilibration (and thus disequilibrium) seems to be a fact of life. While no experimental 
work was conducted to explore this particular issue, many experimental sealed bid 
auctions have been conducted, and that literature was used for reference. 
One early issue was whether the classical oral auction should be used, as opposed 
to a more technologically oriented process. Some voices in the FCC were skeptical of the 
advisability of using new technologies that had no track record in the field. The question 
was, whether or not people could operate in the type of technological environment 
characteristic of new types of processes that were being suggested by theory. The fear 
was, that the behavioral/cognitive demands required by the processes, would simply 
render the processes infeasible. 
These early issues were brought into focus at a meeting held at the California 
Institute of Technology. Experimentalists addressed this issue directly by demonstrating 
the operation of decentralized electronic auction processes. Computerized auctions have 
been operating for years in laboratories where they have been used in laboratory 
experimental applications. Laboratory experiments have demonstrated conclusively that 
people are generally capable of dealing with the "technologically intensive" processes 
that are applied in modern electronic and computerized auctions. The laboratory 
processes also demonstrated that the necessary software and hardware exists in 
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operational form, and can be made reliable. Thus, at the Caltech conference, the 
operation of new processes, based on electronic technology, was demonstrated. 
In addition, conference presentations were made by the Pacific Stock Exchange 
and other parties familiar with the operations of electronic and computerized market 
processes. Thus, while the issue of the "tried and true" against something new continued 
to be raised by some in the debates, experimental data existed that could be used as an 
answer to those concerned about the issue and, in some respects, clearly demonstrated 
that the problem of information and cognitive limitations of people would not be an 
insurmountable obstacle to the implementation of new types of auctions. It also became 
clear that technology was not an obstacle. The consensus developed that new rules could 
be used and the discussion moved to consider the forms that they might take. 
B. Simultaneous Auctions VS Sequential Japanese Auctions with a Package Bid 
Very early on the discussions became narrowed to two different auction architectures. 
These two competing architectures were the focus of many of the early experiments. The 
experiments were designed to inquire about the properties of simultaneous auctions' 
architecture in comparison with sequential auctions that are accompanied by bids on 
predetermined packages. In the latter architecture, a specific set of items would be 
offered for sale, either as a package or individually. Sealed bids would be tendered for 
the package. The winning bid for the package would be announced. After the 
announcement, the markets for individual items would be opened and the items would 
then be individually auctioned. Whether the sale was made by package of items to the 
winning sealed bid, or by individual items to the winners of the individual-item markets, 
was determined by which would generate the most money. The details of the institutions 
studied are as follows: 
(i) Simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions for all items (with and without 
release-to-market provision) 
Within this set of rules, each license would be identified in a separate market. All 
markets would be open simultaneously. Bids could be tendered at any time the bidder 
desired. An accepted bid must be higher than the existing bid. All markets would close 
at the same time, when no market had received a bid for some predetermined period of 
time. That is, if no bids were tendered in any market for a set period, then all markets 
would close simultaneously; but, if a bid occurred in any market, then all markets would 
remain open for at least the predetermined period. 
The method of ending the auction is very important and figures heavily in the 
rules finally adopted by the FCC. The FCC auctions were not continuous but, instead, 
proceeded in rounds. In a continuous market, the continuous threat of the end serves to 
force bidders into action. If there is no action then the markets close, and the faster the 
bidding the sooner the auction will be over. The introduction of rounds gives bidders an 
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incentive to wait. Thus, the FCC adopted activity rules and rules governing eligibility 
that are not part of the earliest experiments. 
The release-to-market provision (withdrawal) gave bidders an opportunity to 
withdraw from units on which they had the high bid. If a unit is released to the market by 
a bidder, then the bid price is dropped and the bidding can then start from the lower level. 
The bidder who withdrew from the item would pay the FCC the difference between the 
bidder's bid and the final bid at which the item sold. The idea is that a bidder who failed 
to get a package would be able to sell the partial package already acquired, back to the 
market. Reselling during the auction, as opposed to after the auction closed, would be 
advantageous because during the auction the demand might be expected to be strong due 
to the assembled buyers at the auction. 
(ii) Sequential, continuous auctions with a sealed bid for a package(s) of predesignated 
collection(s) of items 
Under this proposal, the sealed bids would be opened prior to the opening of the markets 
in which individual items would be auctioned. Two different possibilities existed to 
govern the sequence chosen for the individual item auctions. (i) Japanese auctions would 
be conducted for each item, with items sold in random order. (ii) Japanese auction would 
be conducted for each item, with individual items auctioned in the order from highest 
expected value to the lowest. 
Four institutional features need to be emphasized. First, the auctions for 
individual items are continuous. There are no rounds or stages in the bidding, so the 
termination rule is that the auction remains open until only one person is left. Secondly, 
the Japanese auction is an ascending price auction that only differs in the way that bids 
are tendered. The price goes up at a pace determined by the auctioneer. All bidders are 
considered to be "in," that is, agreeing to purchase at the stated price, unless the bidder 
has explicitly chosen to "drop out." A bidder who has "dropped out" is no longer an 
active bidder on the item and has no standing to buy it, regardless of the final price. The 
price is determined as soon as only one bidder remains "in." That is, the auction stops 
when the next to the last bidder "drops out." The person valuing the item most gets it at 
the value of the bidder with the second highest bid value. 
The third dimension of the rule is the sequence. The items are sold one at a time 
in order. In one case, the order is randomly determined. In another case, the items are 
sold in the order beginning with the item with the highest expected value. In the 
experiment the values of items are randomly drawn with publicly known distributions 
conditional on the item. Thus, the item for which the expected value is the highest is sold 
first. In the field there is often common agreement about the items that are likely to bring 
the highest prices when offered. That feature of common agreement is captured by the 
experimental procedure. 
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The fourth dimension of the rule is a sealed bid for a package that is opened 
before the auction. The collection that constitutes the package is designated prior to the 
auction. If the items, when auctioned individually, do not command prices that total more 
than the items would bring if sold at the winning sealed bid, then they are sold as a 
package to the bidder tendering the highest sealed bid. If the items command a sum of 
prices from the individual auctions that is greater than the sealed bid, then they are sold 
individually. 
C. Rules and Performance 
The overriding question posed for research was related to the efficiency of the allocations 
fostered by the auction rules. Closely related questions concerned the mechanisms 
through which the rules operated. What were the sources of any observed inefficiencies? 
In particular, could packages be efficiently assembled from independent markets, or could 
bidders for independent components compete successfully against a bid for a package? 
Who was advantaged or disadvantaged in different architectures? What was the revenue 
generating potential of the different rules? 
Experiments were conducted with seven and with nine items for auction. Each 
agent had a private value induced for each of the items offered for auction. In some 
cases, agents had a super additive value for a collection of all items. Super additive 
means that the value of the collection of all items was greater for the agent than the sum 
of the values of the items when considered individually. In other cases, agents had super 
additive values for a specific collection of three of the items. 
The key feature of parametric configurations was whether the super additive value 
for the collection was greater than the sum of the highest (first values) of the items 
considered independently, or was less than the sum of first values of items considered 
independently. If the super additive value of the collection was greater than the sum of 
the first values, then the efficient allocation is that the items should be sold as a package 
to the agent with the super additive value. If the sum of the first values was greater than 
the super additive value, then the efficient allocation is that items be sold individually. If 
the auction fails to deliver the items to the hands of the agents valuing them the most, 
then the efficiency of the auction suffers. An auction that operates at 100% efficiency has 
managed to deliver the items exactly to the agents who value them the most. 
In order to make data comparable across institutional treatments, the same 
environmental parameters were conducted in the same sequence of periods for the 
institutions compared. Thus, subjects in different institutional treatments were exposed 
to the same sequence of values. Of course, the subjects differed across institutional 
treatments. If the experiment involved sequential auctions, with items auctioned from 
highest (expected) value to lowest value, then the agents were informed of the probability 
distribution from which agents' values were drawn. 
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The results must all be qualified to emphasize the fact that the number of experiments is 
somewhat limited with respect to environments and institutional perturbations. 
Nevertheless, the patterns that exist in the data are unambiguous. The first result 
summarizes the overall pattern of observations by using efficiency comparisons. The 
result is that the auction system efficiency suffers in the presence of a sealed package bid 
and sequential Japanese auction procedures as compared to the simultaneous auction 
alternative. 
RESULT 1. The overall efficiency of the simultaneous auctions (with a release provision) 
is higher in all experiments than the Japanese auctions with a sealed bid. 
Support. Figure 1 contains a good example of the data. Compared here are two 
experiments under the same conditions each period for a sequence of periods. The 
individual parameters changed each period and shown at the bottom of the figure is a 
notation that indicates if the efficient allocation has items allocated to different 
individuals (I) or the efficient allocation has a collection of items sold to one individual 
(C). Notice, that in twelve out of fifteen periods, the efficiency of the simultaneous 
auctions is at least as high as the Japanese counterpart and in seven periods the efficiency 
of the sequential auctions is strictly better. In only three of the fifteen periods is the 
efficiency of the Japanese auction higher than the simultaneous auction with release. • 
Figure 1 contains the hints of additional results. Notice that the instances in 
which the efficiency of the Japanese auction exceeds the efficiency of the simultaneous 
auctions are exactly the cases in which the sealed bid package is supposed to win 
according to the efficient allocation. This suggests that the sealed bid option creates an 
advantage for the package. The next result makes that property clear. 
RESULT 2. The existence of the package bid option creates an advantage for the agent 
who wants the collection defined by the package. 
Support. Tables 1-a, 1-b, and 1-c contain relevant data. The data are divided into 
two cases. The first case is one in which the value of the collection to some single agent 
is greater than the sum of the highest agent values of the items considered individually 
(and thus should be sold as package to a single agent). The second case is where the 
maximum of agent values, when considering the items individually, sum to more than the 
value of the collection to any single agent. In this second case, the items should be sold 
individually to different agents. Under all conditions studied, when a package bid exists 
as part of the rules, the collection is sold as a package to a single agent when it should be 
sold that way, but in about half of the cases in which the items should be sold 
individually, they are nevertheless sold to the single individual who wants the collection 
as a package. By comparison, under the other auction rules, in which no package bid is 
tendered, the collection is never sold as a package when it should not be. The relative 
advantage of a package bidding process to the agent wanting the package is clear. • 
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Comparative experiments between the simultaneous auctions and sequential Japanese 
auctions with a package sealed bid, yield the following properties summarized by the next 
two results. 
RESULT 3. A bidder wanting the package is advantaged by the Japanese auction with a 
sealed bid for a package, as compared to the same bidder operating under the 
simultaneous auction rules. (i). The sealed bid process always produces an assembled 
package when one should be assembled, while the simultaneous auctions sometimes fail 
to produce a successfully purchased collection. (ii) The sealed bid process frequently 
produces an assembled package when it should not produce one, while the simultaneous 
auction never produces a package when it should not. 
Support. Table 1 contains relevant data. fu Table 1-a the results of experiments 
with three item packages are shown. First, consider the sequential Japanese auction with 
and without a package bid. When it was possible to submit a bid for a package, the 
package always won when it should win (2 of 2 possibilities) but it also won half of the 
time when it should not win (5 of 10 possibilities). The package was always profitable. 
Consider now a comparison with the simultaneous auction. In the three item collection 
experiments, the collection was almost always assembled when it should have been (5 of 
6 possibilities) and was never assembled when it should not have been (0 or 6 
possibilities). fu Table 1-b, the nine item collection was successfully assembled when it 
should have been in most of the instances under both the Japanese auctions and the 
simultaneous auctions with the release provision. However, in the cases in which the 
collection should not be assembled, it was nevertheless successfully assembled in one­
third of the possibilities (5 of 15 possibilities) under the Japanese auction with the sealed 
bid, but it was never successfully assembled when it should not have been when the 
auction were operating under the simultaneous auction rules. • 
RESULT 4. The existence of a sealed bid harms the profits of the items that come late in 
a sequence of auctions. 
Support. Under the sequential auction rules, those that win the early auctions 
have an incentive to bid up the prices of the items that come later in the sequence. These 
bidders do not want to win the items but they do want the prices to be high, so the total of 
the collection will be above the sealed bid. For example, in a paired experiment of 
identical parameters, the price of the final item auctioned under the sequential Japanese 
rules was higher than the same item sold under the simultaneous auction rules (with no 
package bid) in eight of fifteen periods, while the reverse was true in only three of the 
fifteen periods. In the remaining four cases, the_prices were essentially the same. • 
The next result is implicit in the discussion of the results stated above. It is simply stated 
without a review of the data. 
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RESULT 5. An order of individual item auctions, from the highest to the lowest valued 
items, creates an advantage for the sealed bid. 
The final result explores the sources of inefficiency in the simultaneous auctions that 
were studied. The data show that the inefficiencies were not so much from a failed 
attempt at putting together a package, as it was a failure to make any attempt at all. 
Inefficiency was not so much due to the difficulty of coordination, as it was the perceived 
risk in the attempt. 
RESULT 6. Inefficiencies in the simultaneous auctions are due primarily to a failure of 
the agent with the highest value for the collection to attempt to buy the collection. The 
release rule reduces the perceived risk of attempting to buy the collection and thereby 
improves efficiency. 
Support. Package assembly, under the parameters studied (a competitive 
equilibrium exists), is almost always successful when attempted, and successful packages 
have always been profitable. In the three item cases the collections were purchased in 
five of the six instances in which it was efficient and in the nine item case it occurred in 
three of the four times. The most dramatic departure from success was in the seven item 
experiments in which only four attempts were made in seven instances. The power of the 
release provision is captured by the nine item experiments in which no release provision 
existed. Without the release provision, in only four of the nine instances in which the 
collection should have been sold to a single individual, did the individual attempt the 
purchase and then only two of these were profitable. • 
The exact behavior of the auctions can be sensitive to very subtle details of how the 
auction process operates. For example, as is noted in Results 4 and 5, there is a tendency 
to drive up the prices of competitors, especially when it may help increase the value of a 
package to cover a sealed bid. This strategy is risky because a bidder may end up a 
winner of unwanted items. In the Japanese auctions bidders seem to become emboldened 
when they have information about the number of other bidders that are "in." A bidder 
seeing several other bidders "in" is willing to stay in a "little longer" - contributing to a 
type of "bubble" that drives the price up further than it would have been if information 
about the number of other bidders had not been present. Even if the information is not 
officially available as part of the organized auction, the procedures may be such that it 
can be inferred. For example, if all bidders are in the same room, and if exit from the 
auction is accompanied by a "click of a key," or a "blink" of a screen, or any number of 
other subtle sources of information, such bubbles might exist even when efforts are made 
to prevent them. The discovery of such phenomena underscores the need to study the 
operational details of auctions. 
Summarizing all results leads to the following conclusions about the implication 
of the rules when implemented in environments such as those in the experiments : (i) The 
simultaneous auctions with release are more efficient than are the Japanese auctions with 
a sealed bid for the package. (ii) The existence of the sealed bid for a package creates an 
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advantage for the agent wanting the collection, and it creates a disadvantage for those 
wanting items late in the auction sequence (perhaps the smallest agents). 
(iii) Inefficiencies in the simultaneous auctions are primarily due to the fact that agents 
who would have a collection in the efficient allocation, never attempt to assemble the 
package because of risk aversion. When such agents attempt to get the collection, they 
can do so successfully. 
D. Lurking Problems and Alternative Rules 
Soon after the Caltech conference, the FCC began to focus on simultaneous auctions with 
withdrawal provisions as the appropriate set of rules. As the rules began to take form 
throughout the rule making process, the research began to focus on related issues. A 
primary concern of researchers, but not necessarily the FCC, was the sensitivity of the 
behavior of the auction process to the environment in which it might be operating. While 
much information had been produced about the general properties of the simultaneous, 
ascending price auction with a release provision when compared to other rules involving 
sequences of auctions, questions remained about how this set of rules might perform in 
special environments that might reasonably be expected to be present in the 
circumstances in which the FCC auction would be operating. How were the rules going to 
perform under the economic environmental circumstances that were thought to exist? Do 
potential problems exist (in light of nonconvexities, super additive values and uncertain, 
common values)? If problems exist, are they generic in the sense that they would almost 
certainly be encountered and does the interdependence that they foster promote other 
types of behavior, such as collusion? 
It is well known that nonconvexities and super-additive (complementary) values 
can destroy the existence of the equilibrium in the competitive model and can also cause 
instabilities. However, very little is known about what might actually happen in actual 
markets with these properties and during the early stages of rule making, nothing was 
known about the behavior of the particular rules ultimately adopted by the FCC. Figure 2 
can be used to demonstrate the nature of some of the lurking problems in a very simple 
example, which can be applied to both the competitive model and the FCC auction rules. 
S uppose the world consisted of four agents with strong complementary tastes for 
only two units. The essence of complementarity is that values of sets of items are greater 
than the sum of the items when considered independently. In this case, pairs of licenses 
have strong complementarities. The complementarity can be seen by the fact that the 
value of an item depends on whether it is the only item held, or whether it is held in the 
presence of another item. One could say that a special "synergy" exists for two units, but 
agents place zero marginal value on the third unit. In the figure the marginal values of 
each of the four agents are displayed in the order of the average value of two units, 
starting with the agent with the highest average value, agent A, and continuing to the 
agent with the lowest average value, agent D. Only five units are offered for sale. 
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The example and the similar examples that follow, can be used to make two 
points. (i) The auction can lead to losses by participants. (ii) There may be instabilities 
or "cycles" that prevent the auction from stopping. 
In order to develop an intuition about how such phenomena might occur, notice 
first that no competitive equilibrium exists. There is no price that equates supply with 
demand. At any price below the average value of agent C, the marginal buyer, demand 
exceeds supply and at any price at or above the average value of individual C, supply 
exceeds demand. The fact that licenses are "lumpy" creates a non-convexity in the 
environment that destroys existence of that type of equilibrium. 
Now, notice that the complementarities create an instability at the margin that has 
a marginal propensity to push prices up. This property can lead to a loss. Suppose agent 
C acquires one unit in a simultaneous ascending bid auction, then, if the agent follows a 
local, marginal adjustment, (s)he is willing to bid prices up to the marginal value of the 
second unit. Since all units are identical, there must only be one price in the market and 
at the price of the second unit for agent C, all agents, including C, lose money. The price 
is above the average value of all agents. Thus, as one can see, in this environment these 
rules have a potential, theoretically, for leading bidders into circumstances in which they 
can make a loss even though all "local" decisions are profit improving to the deciding 
agent. 
If the rules contain a release clause, then theory gives no guide about how the 
process might stop. If prices ascend to above the average value of any of the agents, then 
(s)he may want to release the unit to the market and take a certain loss, rather than test the 
competition into larger regions of loss. When the price is sufficiently low, it could attract 
a new buyer (like D) and start the spiral upward again. Thus, from a naive, theoretical 
point of view, the auction could experience a series of withdrawals over long periods of 
time and never attain a natural closing within an acceptable time frame. Prices would just 
cycle. 
Experiments demonstrated that the theoretical possibility of losses is also a real 
possibility. Figure 3 contains the data from an experiment with parameters of the form 
discussed above. The horizontal lines represent some of the important parameters of the 
experiment. The top horizontal line is the counterpart of the marginal value of the second 
unit for agent C. If the price is bid to the level of the top horizontal line, then losses will 
certainly occur. The two middle lines are the counterparts of the average value of 
individuals C and D, respectively. The data represent the bids on all items and the time 
of submission, measured in the number of seconds that transpired from the opening of the 
auction. As can be seen, the time series of bids begins low and continues along what 
appears to be an exponential path, with some interesting "waves" until the auction ends. 
As is readily observable, the prices of items tend to equate and finally settle near the 
average value of the marginal agent. Of course, since the marginal agent had a unit at this 
price (s)he lost money. 
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Experiments also demonstrated that the theoretical possibility of cycles is also 
real. Figure 4 contains data from two additional experiments. Again, the data follow a 
somewhat exponential path toward the average value of the marginal agent. Again, the 
')umps" or "waves" are present. However, in panel A of Figure 4 an item is released. 
According to the rules of this particular auction, any released item begins at a price of 
zero, so the sequence of bids that bring the price of the released items up to the levels of 
the others is observed. Since the new price of the item is above the average value of the 
marginal person, the new holder lost money. Panel B shows that releases can occur more 
than once during an auction. As can be seen in that experiment, the item was released 
two times, leading to a cycle of length three. 
The existence of strong complementarities creates a special kind of competition 
that does not facilitate efficiency. Complex synergies foster complex "fitting" problems 
from which substantial gains are possible. This process of coordination that is necessary 
for fitting might be accompanied by other activities considered undesirable. If a 
competitor detects that a rival or two have managed to coordinate their actions so they 
"fit," the firm can damage them both by getting into the bidding action. This is a type of 
"destructive competition" in which one agent can make it difficult for a competitor to 
obtain a "package," even when the package represents an efficient allocation. An agent 
might try to damage others that (s)he views as competitors by driving up the prices, or by 
acquiring key elements of a package that is of special value to a competitor or to the "fit" 
of a group of competitors. Evidence of the ability and the willingness of agents to engage 
in bidding activities intended only to influence the allocations of other agents was 
contained in Result 4 .  Further evidence was exhibited in by the willingness of 
competitors to drive up the price of rivals in the Japanese auction. No systematic 
evidence exists on the nature of this potentially "destructive" competition, but what we do 
have suggests that it cannot be simply dismissed as implausible. 
One solution to the problem of destructive competition would be to shield the 
identities of the agents. Firms would be unable to collude and would be unable to 
identify particular rivals that they would be willing to damage. However, a tension exists 
between knowing and not knowing the identities of the bidders. If a firm is attempting to 
put together some sort of package, then other firms might be advised to explore packages 
that fit. Successful fitting would be difficult to achieve by simple random bidding and, 
instead, requires an understanding of the firm's intentions. However, to understand the 
other firm's strategy, it is necessary to be able to identify that firm with bids. Multiple 
identification numbers have been mentioned in this context. A firm could use some 
identification numbers to signal intentions where needed and other identification numbers 
to hide. The nature of these complex strategic possibilities has not been explored. We 
only know that the potential exists and that there might be institutional "fixes." 
The final environmental problem stems from the fact that the PCS licenses are 
thought to have a common but uncertain value. It has been well established 
experimentally that in such environments a "winner's curse" phenomenon can exist (for a 
review of the literature, see Kagel, 1995). Each bidder has private information about the 
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common value. If this information is distributed with the true value as a mean then the 
highest privately estimated value is greater than the true value. If propensity to bid is 
positively related to privately estimated value then the high bidder will be the agent 
whose private value is the highest above the true value. Unless this property of auctions 
is recognized the agent will bid more for the item than its value and as a result make a 
loss from the auction. How this might work out when there is a sequence of bids and 
complementarities is simply unknown. No experiments have been conducted which 
provide an assessment of what the dimensions of the problem might be. 
In summary, the FCC auction is exploring those domains of economic 
environments about which very little is known: non-convexities, complementarities and 
asymmetric information. The rules of the auction were designed specifically to cope with 
parts of these environmental conditions. The simultaneous nature of the auctions and the 
withdrawal feature were specifically implemented to facilitate efficient allocations in the 
presence of such features. Nevertheless, problems are lurking. It is easy to find 
parameters in which agents make losses, the system cycles and the results are not close to 
100% efficient. Does withdrawal help in the very "difficult" cases or does it simply lure 
people into traps in which they can lose money? 
Modifications of the simultaneous auctions are still a subject of research. One 
issue is whether or not the process should be continuous, as opposed to the stages that are 
now in place. Continuous auctions have many advantages over the stages. In particular, 
with continuous auctions there is no obvious need for eligibility rules and the related 
complex stopping rules. The stages seem be a response to businesses expressing a need 
to have time to make decisions, garner the capital for big purchases, and assemble the 
information needed for bidding. The stages also seem to reflect some doubt about the 
ability of technology to facilitate a continuous auction. 
A lack of confidence in technology, as well as a lack of theory, seemed to dampen 
enthusiasm for the implementation of a "smart market" that would be capable of dealing 
with complex bids for packages of licenses. Many experiments have explored the use of 
package bidding in the context of electronic markets.1 Such markets have demonstrated a
capability of solving very hard coordination problems. How they might be made to 
manage common value problems or destructive competition, remains to be determined. 
4. THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AUCTION TECHNOLOGY:
THE SECOND STAGE
The second stage of ·applications· involved ·testing the-implementation of the specific rules 
selected to govern the auction. The problems that were addressed stemmed from three 
sources. First, the language of lawyers and those writing policy is not precise from the 
1 There are different styles of such markets. For examples see: Banks, Ledyard, and Porter (1989); 
Brewer and Plott (Forthcoming); Rassenti, Reynolds, and Smith (1994); and Rassenti, Smith, and Bulfin 
(1982). 
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point of view of game theorists, who attempt to model the behavior of the system. Terms 
that make sense from the point of view of the law can be very imprecise, and depending 
upon interpretation, could have dramatic effects on the structure of the auction and 
consequent behavior. Secondly, complex systems of rules involve subtle interactions and 
ambiguities. Rules must be internally consistent and they must be complete in the sense 
that an outcome is produced by the process under all circumstances. The complex ways 
in which the rules interact, and the presence of ambiguities, do not become evident until 
one tries to actually implement the rules in an operational environment. Thus, as part of 
the research it was necessary to evaluate the consistency and completeness of the rules 
themselves, as opposed to any assessment of behavior within the context of the rules. A 
laboratory experiment requires the translation of policy concepts to operational concepts, 
so the process of experimentation actually produces a working auction prototype. The 
third source of problems stemmed from the software and hardware. It was necessary to 
determine if the software and procedures of the auction successfully implemented the 
rules, as stated in policy. Even if the rules were complete and consistent in one 
implementation, they might not be in another. Software implementation and auction 
procedures must be explored from the point of view of game theory and the strategic 
opportunities that a real environment fosters. 
A group of economists from Caltech2 was contracted to test the software and
advise on rules and their implementation. Cantor-Fitzgerald was contracted to develop 
the software for the first narrowband auction in July, 1994. After the July auction, 
another contractor was selected to develop software for subsequent auctions. Evidently, 
the FCC wanted to own the software and this was not consistent with the interests of 
Cantor-Fitzgerald, which used modifications of software that the company uses for 
market making in the bond industry. The Caltech team was associated with the 
development and implementation of both technologies. 
There are several problems that exist in the many steps between policy conception 
and operational implementation in the field. First, the exact "rules" were always in a state 
of evolution. There is a learning that takes place as the rules are implemented. The 
interactions among rules are subtle and a tension exists between fairness and proper price 
discovery and, as this tension is discovered, there is a tendency for the latter to give way 
to the former under the pressure of politics. For example, if the auction is taking too long 
and must be stopped, how should that be accomplished? Many reasonable answers to 
such questions were advanced, such as a single best and final offer, closing specific 
markets in which no new bids have been tendered, requiring bidders to bid only on items 
on which they previously bid, etc. 
It was perceived that a person might have personal reasons to not want to bid, so 
waivers were invented and then automatic waivers were required of the software. The 
concepts of withdrawals, eligibility, increments, and announcement of stage changes, all 
involve reasonable sounding concepts when considered alone, but there remain questions 
2 They were John Ledyard, Charles Plott and Dave Porter. 
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about how they might interact together, with other policies, or with the realities of 
software performance. Can one waiver and bid at the same time? What happens if you 
withdraw at the end of the auction - should the auction remain open so the withdrawal can 
be cleared? How shall a withdraw be priced? How is eligibility of everyone influenced 
by withdrawals - should it go up so anyone can buy the item released to the market? How 
is eligibility influenced by increments - should eligibility be lost if increments are reduced 
because of lack of bids? As these interactions become discovered, there is a tendency to 
change the policy. 
In the first FCC auctions there was a tendency for policy changes to take place 
without a full recognition of what it might mean for software development and the time 
frame needed for that development and testing, as well as the likelihood that small 
changes in policy would create a need for further changes that would be discovered only 
as the implementation process advanced. More importantly, the technical complexity and 
subtleties of game implementation were not fully recognized and reflected in the 
procedures for communicating with software developers. Moreover, the importance and 
the technical complexity of the link between policy and rigorous institutional design was 
not fully appreciated and that lead to problems that were potentially very severe. 
When the Caltech team first tested the Cantor-Fitzgerald software, they 
discovered that Cantor had not been properly informed about the time line within an 
auction (that there are necessarily bid periods, a computation period, a withdrawal period, 
etc. , within each round). The policy language was not sufficiently precise to identify 
exact actions with time (Cantor had been lead to believe that phase 3 was a "stay in your 
own lane" policy, etc.). A week before the first auction, the Cantor programming team 
met with the Caltech team and the FCC. From that meeting a complete reprogramming 
of the auction software was undertaken according to an architecture that previously had 
not been communicated to Cantor. 
Time pressure before the first auction gave very little opportunity to test the 
Cantor software before the July auction took place. Because of these difficulties, the 
FCC felt the need to provide a non-electronic "backup system" for the July auction. It 
hired the Caltech team to develop one. The non electric backup was made possible by 
virtue of the facts that all bidders were at the same location, a hotel meeting room. The 
Caltech experimentalists had practice and experience in implementing such auctions in 
laboratory environments. To the Caltech group it was simply a bigger experiment than 
the ones that they had been conducting all along. When implemented during the July 
auction, the backup system ran in parallel with the Cantor electronic system, which 
operated successfully. The backup system was just about as speedy as the Cantor system, 
and also operated without flaw. 
After the July auction, the FCC contracted with new software developers. The 
Caltech group agreed to test the new software to make sure the rules were appropriately 
implemented. However, testing was made very difficult by FCC policies. The FCC 
adopted a policy of not letting the Caltech team have access to the final software, study 
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(or see) the code, or even talk directly to a software developer. Thus, the auction process 
was a "black box" from the point of view of the Caltech testers. 
The strategy for dealing with the problem of testing was to implement a three part 
system consisting of experiments, "user bounties," and parallel checking. First, the 
overall strategy adopted by the experimentalists was to use the software as it would be 
used in an experiment. Preferences were induced by application of standard experimental 
economics techniques. Subjects then used the software in a series of actual experimental 
auctions that lasted several days. During these experiments the subjects were at Caltech 
but the computers and the FCC auctioneers were in Washington, DC. This methodology 
facilitated learning derived from user experiences. From the point of view of the users, 
the experiments revealed many practical software problems that could have caused 
serious difficulties if discovered in the field during the FCC auctions. 
The second part of the strategy involved payments (sizable bounties of one 
hundred dollars or more) to subjects able to find errors in any facet of the auction system. 
Student subjects from Caltech were trained at the first of the summer. They completely 
understood the details of rules and subtle variations of the rules. The same subjects were 
used over and over for anything that dealt with software tests. The subjects were paid for 
keeping notebooks and diaries, so a clear record was maintained about the time and the 
state of the system when errors were (asserted to be) found. This second procedure 
allowed us to utilize the special knowledge and skills of this particular, trained, subject 
pool. The subjects explored the rules, the auction setup procedures and even the user 
friendliness of the software. 3 The "user bounty" procedures are commonly used by 
experimentalists when developing software for laboratory use. 
A third system of checks was a system of "parallel checking." Since the FCC 
auction software and procedures were used to conduct experiments, the data from the 
experimental auction were available. These data were fed into a parallel auction software 
system for computation and comparisons. The parallel system took the raw bid data and 
from them recomputed all numbers computed by the FCC auction computers. These 
computations were made during the experiment and afterwards. The parallel system 
operated from a program that we developed ourselves and for which we were virtually 
certain that the proper rules and computations had been implemented. All computations 
made by the FCC programs were rechecked. This method of checking proved valuable in 
3 Some examples of the types of tests are: What happens if you stay logged on after the initial withdrawal; 
what happens if you log in from multiple locations at the same time; what happens if you enter 0000 rather 
than O; what happens if you are theoretically inactive but nevertheless log on after various events; what 
happens if you log in at the last seconds of a session or have a power failure; what happens if you follow 
local software installation exactly to the "letter" of the instructions, etc. The complaints about friendliness 
were enough to create enemies: My screen scrolls too fast, too much, too slow; response time is too fast, 
too slow; etc., etc. The test experiments put substantial pressure on the whole FCC auction organization to 
do rounds quickly, which was important since the speed of the rounds is a variable that might be used to 
speed the termination of the overall auction. 
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several instances when we were able to "reverse engineer" the FCC system to identify the 
source of programming errors.4
5. THE AUCTIONS AND A RETROSPECTIVE ON PERFORMANCE: THE THIRD STAGE
The final stage of the research was to provide advice during the operation of the actual 
FCC auction. Regardless of the amount of preparation and testing, things happen. 
Behavior might not be as anticipated due to environmental surprises. In spite of testing, 
rules can be incomplete and policy must sometimes be made on the spot. Decisions must 
be made on the spot from experience and judgment. During the first auctions, the 
experimentalists were the only ones that had studied the actual operations of auctions like 
the one implemented by the FCC. The hope was that the insights that resulted from 
observing laboratory experiments would be helpful in the field application. 
The active participation of the experimentalists during an auction occurred only in 
the first auction in July, 1994. It was here that the procedures for interacting with the 
bidders and the rules for the real time operation of the auctions began to take form. An 
increment committee was formed by the FCC. The job of this committee was to provide 
policy advice about the minimum allowable bids, the speed of rounds, announcements, 
the implementation of stages, etc. Plott was a member of the committee, in addition to 
participation in the backup process. 
The experiences gained from laboratory experiments informed the management of 
the first auction in two ways. Firstly, the experiments had produced many examples of 
the interaction of procedures, rules, and events that could cause problems in the auction 
itself, or invite litigation afterwards. Secondly, the patterns of activity in the FCC could 
be interpreted in the light of the behavior of experiments to gain insights about what was 
taking place and what might be expected in future rounds. 
Laboratory experiments had demonstrated a propensity for agents to 
misunderstand subtle aspects of the rules. If this happened in the FCC auction it might be 
the foundation for a court case. It order to prevent this possibility, during each round the 
auctioneer made announcements to bidders about critical aspects of the rules, especially 
those regarding withdrawal and the role of eligibility. Near the end of the auction these 
general announcements were clearly unnecessary, but those in charge of the auction kept 
a close eye on agents who might be exhibiting confusion. Help was made available for 
clarifications of the rules. 
4 Important rounding errors were discovered. A miscomputation of eligibility, a type of double counting 
after a withdrawal, was discovered. Difficulties with eligibility computations after waivers and between 
phases were checked with this method. The subjects were attempting many unexpected combinations of 
actions in their attempt to find errors themselves, and this variability in behavior provided an excellent 
opportunity to check the internal operations of the "black box" that we were given to reverse engineer. 
While many bugs were found and corrected, one can never be positive about software reliability. 
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The speed of the auction was a general concern. The increment committee was 
formed to force bids upward and thus speed the process to termination by determining for 
each license the minimum acceptable bid increment. Very early on, the committee chose 
to demonstrate a willingness to use no fixed rule. This established the right of the 
committee to make such judgments, creating some uncertainty on the part of bidders that 
might be useful for managing the auction, and it provided some flexibility in controls. 
Some in the FCC thought that a combination of increment rules and stages was sufficient 
control to speed up the auction and bring it to an efficient termination. A tension existed 
between the idea that more time to make considered bids, coupled with higher increments 
on acceptable bids, would speed the auction on the one hand, and on the other hand, the 
idea that the termination of the auction was governed primarily by the number of rounds. 
Thus, one theory would have the auction take more time between rounds and the other 
theory would suggest that the rounds be more frequent. Experimental evidence suggested 
that frequent rounds could be relied upon to generate an efficient and rapid termination. 
Many of the early experiments that were allowed to terminate naturally involved 
continuous time processes without stages. Examination of these data suggested that the 
FCC auction could go as many as one hundred rounds or so. The more rapid the rounds, 
the sooner would be the termination. Experiments had also produced evidence of the 
capacity of large increments to be "demand killing." A bidder failing to bid because of a 
large increment could lose eligibility. If the increment was subsequently reduced, the 
bidder might not have the eligibility to allow the purchase that (s)he would have 
otherwise made at the lower price. 
Fear of such an event placed the experimentalists in the camp of those against the 
use of large increment requirements on bids. The possibility of demand killing policies 
were very slight, as long as the process operated in stages one or two. However, if stage 
three is implemented, demand killing is a real possibility. Regarding stage three, a 
tension existed among those who felt that stage three would operate like "breaks" and 
speed the process to termination. On the other side were those who felt that more 
frequent rounds were a safer way to bring the process to termination. 
The first auction was held in a Washington, DC, hotel that the FCC had rented for 
only a limited amount of time. If the auction failed to terminate within the time frame of 
the rental then the whole auction would need to be moved to another location. Because 
the move would involve the transfer of equipment and electronic configurations, such a 
move involved risks to the smooth functioning of the auction. As the final date 
approached, support grew for taking the first auction from stage two to stage three in an 
attempt to bring it to a close. Plott argued against this change: (i) in stage three the 
possibility of demand killing increments was the greatest; (ii) a possibility of withdrawal 
existed (recall Figure 4 panels A and B above) and if it occurred the demand killing 
feature of the third stage would be present; (iii) the software for stage three had not been 
tested (in retrospect there was a bug); (iv) the time path of the bids suggested that the 
process was converging to an orderly termination and that there was only a need to speed 
the rounds. After consultation with the bidders, the rounds were speeded and stage three 
was never implemented. 
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As the auction proceeded there were continuous attempts to make judgments 
about the state of the system and where it might go. What were the patterns that were 
reminiscent of laboratory auctions? Was there evidence of scalebacks by bidders because 
of budgets and were marginal buyers evident? Are there similarities between the 
laboratory market and the FCC auction? If there are similarities, what can we conclude 
about the FCC auction? The FCC auctions certainly produced a lot of money, but how 
would one know if they worked to allocate the licenses efficiently? What would the 
experiments tell us to look for and under what circumstances should we look? 
Unfortunately, existing research does not yet produce a good answer. We can only 
compare one of the major features of the data. 
Experiments exhibit equilibration to predictable magnitudes. Figure 5 reports 
data from an experiment that was used to test the FCC software prior to the October 
auction. The parameters chosen for the experiment were similar to those that might exist 
in the auction and the general conditions of the experiment were among those that were 
thought to possibly exist for the actual auction. Thirty licenses were offered in the 
experiment, exactly like the October auction. 
The demand and supplies are shown in Figure 6. The demand curve for any 
particular license was derived from the assumption that all other markets were at the 
competitive equilibrium price and that the agents allocated a fixed budget among licenses 
to maximize the induced preference. The values of the demand prices are shown above 
the curve. The units are on the horizontal and the vertical lines are the supplies. A 
different market demand is shown for each of ten types of licenses. Within a license type 
the licenses are homogeneous. The competitive equilibrium prices are shown as the 
prices that are at the intersection of the market demand and supply. 
The revenues from the experiment are shown in Figure 5. The revenue predicted 
by the competitive equilibrium model is the horizontal line. As can be seen, the revenue 
moves upward in a somewhat wavy fashion along what appears to be an exponential path 
with a "jump" at the end that is probably caused by an FCC intervention in the 
experiment. 5 This experiment, like many other experiments, converges to near the 
competitive equilibrium. 
Figure 7 shows the time path of the revenues generated by the October FCC 
auction for thirty licenses. As can be seen, there the path has the same qualities of an 
exponential path and converges. It also has the "bumps" and "waves" along the path that 
are evident in the experimental data. The bottom curve of Figure 7 helps us see the 
underlying nature of the revenue generating process. The curve is the value of excess 
5 The FCC phoned during the test experiment and informed us that the test must stop because they needed 
to move the equipment for a demonstration. The experiment was terminated shortly after that. A second 
test conducted in October suffered the same fate when the FCC called and informed us that "the next round 
would be the last." The FCC person in charge had evidently concluded (incorrectly) that the FCC software 
was working properly. The parallel computation procedure found an error in the FCC software later. 
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bids and shows the adjustments in bidding as relative prices increase. The structure of 
these changes suggests that the agents operated with budgets, and when prices got so high 
that the budget would have been exceeded, they scaled back to cheaper items. The FCC 
auctions seem to have a property of equilibration, and if the principles of operation are 
the same as the principles of operation in the experiments, then the convergence is near 
the competitive equilibrium - should it exist. 
The allocations in the experiment are shown as the black squares under the 
demand curves. The demand curve above the square is the marginal value of the unit to 
the buyer and the number beside the square is the price paid for the unit. As can be seen, 
the prices in the experiment for equivalent items are similar. That is also a property of 
the FCC auction data. From the experimental allocations, we can also determine that the 
experimental auctions were relatively efficient. Notice that the units under the demand 
curve tend to be the ones acquired, and when the units are the external margins and 
beyond, the ones that they replace are simply the units on the internal margin, so the 
efficiency loss is not very large. Thus, if the FCC auctions are operating by the same 
principles, we can conclude that they are relatively efficient. 
Thus, the FCC auctions and the laboratory experimental auctions have several 
qualitative features in common. If indeed the same principles were operating in the FCC 
environment then the FCC auction converged to near the competitive equilibrium and 
exhibited high efficiency. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
While the use of laboratory experimental methodology is still in its infancy, it seems clear 
that the value of the techniques was decisively demonstrated in the development of the 
FCC auctions. The overall success of the auctions must be attributed to others -
economic theorists, applied economists, FCC lawyers, and the FCC staff. However, at 
certain critical junctures, experimental methods supplied data and insights that helped 
identify and solve problems that could have caused serious damage to the overall auction 
effort if they had gone undetected. The laboratory methods provided an inexpensive and 
timely source of data and experience that supplemented the major efforts in the policy 
making process. The laboratory methods uncovered problems of a type that could not 
have been discovered by any other method, except (possibly very expensive) field testing. 
It is interesting to compare the FCC auctions with large scale engineering projects. 
The rule making procedures that the FCC inherits by virtue of being a governmental 
agency would never be used for engineering decisions. Imagine building a spacecraft 
with detailed engineering decisions made through the processes dictated by administrative 
procedures. Yet, in many respects, decisions regarding the detail of rules for complex 
auctions are like engineering decisions. The problems are certainly as complex as those 
found in engineering projects and there exist solid theoretical and experimental 
foundations for making decisions about auction design. The application of science has 
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been made possible by the astounding progress that has taken place in economics. It 
would seem as though some alternative process should be created for institutional design 
problems that permit designs to reflect scientific considerations as opposed to political 
considerations. Nevertheless, in spite of what would seem to be the cumbersome and 
antiquated procedures dictated by administrative processes, the FCC produced a system 
that has so far operated effectively. Hopefully, the problems that are known to be lurking 
and are known to cause problems within the types of rules the FCC has adopted, will not 
make themselves visible in future applications. Objective analysis can be applied and 
laboratory testing can be used. Possibly, in the future, the policy making process can 
systematically incorporate these scientific advances into decisions. 
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Table 1-a 
Seven Item Experiments with Two Collections of Three Items with Super Additive 
Values. (Number of times event occurred/Number of times event was possible) 
Japanese Japanese Simultaneous 
Auction with Auction with Auction with 
Sealed Bid for no Sealed Bids. Withdrawal 
package. Random Order Provision 
Random Order 
Collection was 2 successes/ 2 successful/ 5 successful/ 
Value of the successfully 2 periods 2 periods 6 periods 
package is assembled 
greater than the 
sum of the first Collection 2 of 2  1 of 2  5 of 5 
values assembled was assembled assembled assembled 
profitable collections collections collections 
were profitable were profitable were profitable 
Collection was 5 successes/ 0 successes/ 0 successes/ 
Value of the successfully 10 periods 10 periods 6 periods 
package is less assembled 
than the sum of Collection 5 of 5 
the first values assembled was assembled 
profitable collections 
were profitable 
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Table 1-b 
Nine Item Experiments with Super Additive Values for all Nine Items. (Number of 
times event occured/Number of times event was possible) 
Japanese Simultaneous Simultaneous 
Au.ction with Auction with Auction with · 
Sealed B id for No· Withdrawal Withdrawal 
package. Provision Provision 
Random Order 
Collection was 2 successes/ 4 successful/ 3 successful/ 
Value of the successfully 3 periods 9 periods 4 periods 
package is assembled 
greater than the 
sum of the first Collection 2 of 2 2 of 2 3 of 3
values assembled was assembled assembled assembled 
profitable collections collections collections 
were profitable were profitable were profitable 
Collection was 5 successes/ 0 successes/ 0 successes/ 
Value of the successfully 1 5  periods 8 periods 3 periods 
package is less assembled 
than the sum of Collection 5 of 5 
the first values assembled was assembled 
profitable collections 
were profitable 
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Table 1-c 
Nine Item Experiments with Super Additive Values for all Nine Items. (Number of 
times event occured/Number of times event was possible) 
Japanese Simultaneous 
Auction with Auction with 
Sealed Bid for Withdrawal 
package. Provision 
Ordered by 
Expected 
Values 
4 successful/ 
Collection was 7 successes/ 6 periods (Two 
Value of the successfully 7 periods never tried to 
package is assembled get the 
greater than the collection) 
sum of the first Collection 7 of 7 4 of 4 
values assembled was assembled assembled 
profitable collections collections 
were profitable were profitable 
Collection was 6 successes/ 0 successes/ 
Value of the successfully 9 periods 8 periods 
package is less assembled 
than the sum of Collection 6 of 6  
the first values assembled was assembled 
profitable collections 
were profitable 
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